intrODUCtiOn
The 2003 MMA created Medicare Part D, a voluntary prescription drug benefit program. The benefit is a government sub sidized prescription drug benefit within Medicare and is administered by private sector plans. Such plans may be stand alone prescription drug plans (PDPs) or Medicare Advantage prescription drug plans (MA-PDs). While there are numerous important components determining how these plans are paid, this article focuses on the development of the prescription drug risk-adjustment model used to adjust pay ments to reflect the health status of plan enrollees. According to the MMA, pay ments are based on a standardized plan bid that represents the estimated cost for an enrollee with average risk and a score of 1.0. Payments for each enrollee are risk adjusted by multiplying the standardized bid by a person-level risk factor so that plan John Robst is with the University of South Florida. Jesse M. Levy is with the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS). Melvin J. Ingber is with RTI International. The statements expressed in this article are those of the authors and do not nec essarily reflect the views or policies of the University of South Florida, RTI International, or CMS. payments reflect the projected health of actual enrollees. Higher standardized bids result in higher per enrollee revenues, but also higher premiums in the competitive market. The process of developing the pre scription drug risk-adjustment model, CMS prescription drug hierarachical condition categories (RxHCC) are also described in this article.
BaCKgrOUnD
The basic Medicare prescription drug benefit structure partially covers the expenses of the majority of plan enrollees and has a catastrophic benefit for very high users. A Part D enrollee pays a premium, which was expected to be approximately $35 1 a month. Enrollment is on a volun tary basis. There is a premium increase for those who enroll after their initial oppor tunity, as there is in Medicare Part B. The structure of the standard benefit for 2006 is shown in Figure 1 .
Enrollees are responsible for the first $250 in drug expenditures. The standard benefit package covers 75 percent of the next $2,000 in drug expenditures. Once total expenditures reach $2,250, the ben eficiary is responsible for all costs in what has become known as the "donut hole." The 100 percent coinsurance continues until total drug expenditures reach $5,100 ($1,500 plan liability plus $3,600 out-of pocket expenses). The catastrophic por tion of the benefit covers 95 percent of any additional drug expenditures: 15 percent of 
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Reinsurance Enrollee Liability Plan Liability NOTES: Plan liability represents the portion of annual drug spending paid by the drug plan. Enrollee liability represents the portion of annual drug spending paid by the beneficiary. For example, at $3,000 in annual drug spending, $1,500 is paid by the plan and $1,500 by the enrollee.
SOURCE: Robst, J., University of South Florida, Levy, J.M., Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services, and Ingber, M.J., RTI International, 2007. the cost is the plan's responsibility; 80 per cent is reinsurance paid by Medicare. In the early years there is also plan-Medicare risk sharing for the difference between Medicare payments and actual plan opera tional costs computed in a year-end recon ciliation. The coverage thresholds are to be indexed for inflation in future years. PDPs and MA-PDs have some flexibility in offer ing plans that differ from the standard ben efit. In addition, formularies are set by the plans, subject to legislated requirements, and may vary across plans. Payments to PDPs and MA-PDs are risk adjusted, since payments are based on a standardized bid amount, which assumes an enrollee with a risk factor of 1.0. Using a standardized bid to determine the benefi ciary premiums insulates the beneficiary from the variation in health status of plan enrollees. Medicare pays the adjustment for risk. The starting point for the bid is the projected monthly revenue require ments to provide defined standard drug coverage for an enrollee with the plan's projected average risk factor. The standard ized bid is computed by dividing monthly revenue requirements by the plan's pro jected average risk factor. Payment adjust ments above the risk-adjusted rate are made for low-income and long-term institu tionalized beneficiaries due to their higher expected utilization. There are several prescription drug riskadjustment models that have been devel oped. Some are based on the prior use of drugs to predict future medical costs or future prescription drug use. We could not use such a methodology to develop our model. In order to implement the pro gram, we needed to compute risk scores for all Medicare beneficiaries. Since we lacked drug utilization data for most ben eficiaries, we were unable to implement this type of model. Once the drug benefit is established, data on prior utilization will be available for use in calibration. Gilmer et al. (2001) developed a model that predicts prospective Medicaid medical costs based on base year prescription drug utilization. Drug claims were analyzed, with national drug codes (NDCs) grouped together based on the disease they are typically used to treat. Thus, it is similar to other risk-adjustment models in that it uses diseases to predict future costs, but infers the diagnoses from prescription drug use, not ICD-9-CM codes. Zhao et al. (2005) found that models using diagnoses and prior drug use predict future prescription drug costs better than models using only diagnostic data. Such research highlights the need to consider prior use in future model development. Inclusion of utilization measures among predictor variables must be done with cau tion in payment models, in contrast to ana lytical models, as perverse incentives to increase utilization or to favor a particular mode of treatment can be generated.
While prior drug use may predict future drug use better than diagnostic data, addi tional work was needed to determine whether diagnostic data sufficiently pre dict future drug use to produce the desired drug risk-adjustment model. Wrobel et al. (2003 Wrobel et al. ( /2004 
Data SOUrCeS anD MODel Overview
Data Sources
Development of a risk-adjustment model for drug spending depends on having appropriate data from which to create diagnosis groups and cost estimates. As there were no Part D data available, CMS used drug expenditure data for Federal retirees with Medicare in the Federal Employee Health Benefit plan run by Blue Cross ® Blue Shield ® (BCBS). The BCBS plan is national in scope, with uniform ben efits. The BCBS pharmacy benefit plan is an uncapped benefit with a coinsurance amount for retail purchases and two tiers of copayment for mail order purchases. Only those retirees age 65 were used from these data. For disabled beneficiaries under age 65, data on Medicare and Medicaid dually eligible beneficiaries from the Medicaid Statistical Information System (MSIS) were used. For each data set the development of the model used diagnoses from standard Medicare files and drug spending from each program's drug benefit. The BCBS plan spending year 2002 was used for cali bration. For Medicaid, the latest available data linked to Medicare were for spending year 2000.
Next, we obtained information for these beneficiaries from the enrollee database (EDB). The EDB is the primary reposi tory for Medicare current and historical enrollment and entitlement data. It was the source of demographic and Medicare Pro gram information not available in the BCBS plan or Medicaid data. Critical data from the EDB includes Parts A and B coverage periods, hospice coverage, and managed care coverage periods.
We used diagnostic information from the Medicare Provider Analysis and Review (MEDPAR), hospital outpatient, and physi cian claims from the base years (2001 for the BCBS plan and 1999 for Medicaid). Diagnoses were accepted from the fol lowing five source records: (1) principal hospital inpatient; (2) secondary hospital inpatient; (3) a hospital outpatient; (4) phy sician; and the (5) clinically-trained nonphysician (e.g., psychologist, podiatrist). The model does not distinguish among sources. These are the same data sources for diagnoses used in the CMS-HCC model.
The BCBS plan data provided to CMS contain annual prescription drug expendi tures for each enrollee and annual copay ments by enrollees. We converted the BCBS plan costs to total pharmacy costs for each beneficiary by adding the beneficia ry's cost sharing amounts to the BCBS plan costs. The BCBS plan offered two different types of benefits in 2002: standard benefits and basic. The standard pharmacy benefit included a 25 percent coinsurance on retail pharmacy purchases, while the mail order benefit had a two-tiered copayment. The basic benefit included a two-tiered copay ment on retail purchases, and no mail order benefit. Retail pharmacy costs for enrollees in the standard BCBS plan were imputed using the BCBS plan costs and the 25 percent coinsurance.
Medicaid was more difficult, however. Additional modifications to the data were necessary to remove certain drug claims from the data because Part D specifically does not cover certain drugs. Only prescrip tion drugs are included, but with Medicare Part B covered drugs removed. Drugs cov ered by Part B, such as immuno-suppres sives, will continue to be covered by Part B Medicare. Removal of the Part B drugs was straightforward in the Medicaid data as each claim has both an NDC and amount paid. Adjusting the BCBS plan data was more complex. We had only total spending for each person, with no paid amount on the claims to be excluded. Using the Medicaid data we estimated the percent age reduction in spending associated with removal of Part B drugs for beneficiaries with conditions associated with high use, such as cancers and transplants. We then reduced spending for similar beneficiaries in the BCBS plan files in the same propor tion. Other non-covered drugs, benzodiaz epines, and barbiturates, were intentionally left in the file because their costs proxy for the costs of substitutes. This was deemed preferable to removing the claims and costs altogether.
At the conclusion of the data compila tion, for each beneficiary we had demo graphic, programmatic, and diagnostic information for the base year along with prescription drug cost information for the payment year. Descriptive statistics for the BCBS plan and Medicaid samples are provided in Table 1 . Given beneficiary cost sharing, a plan offering the standard benefit is liable for less than one-half total drug expenditures. The Medicaid sample is younger on average than the BCBS plan sample because all ages, including the dis abled under age 65 can be dually eligible beneficiaries, while there is no equivalent group in the BCBS plan data. Conse quently, disease prevalence is different for the two samples.
We stratified each data set into two groups. The first group comprised those for whom we had sufficient information to include them in the risk-adjustment estima tion model. For the purpose of calibrating a drug risk-adjustment model, we began with the population of fee-for-service Medi care beneficiaries with Medicare Parts A and B for the entire base calendar year. This allowed us to have a complete year of diagnostic information for these beneficia ries. We further required that individuals be enrolled in the BCBS plan or Medicaid Program for at least one day in the pay ment year. It is important to retain people with less than full payment year eligibility to capture the potentially different drug use pattern of decedents. Weighting is applied to partial year enrollees. The second group comprised those for whom we did not have a year of complete diagnostic information, but for whom we had prescription drug costs in the follow ing year. These beneficiaries could not be used for model estimation. Nevertheless, they represent one group of enrollees who must be given a score based on information other than diagnoses. A model for these new enrollees is also created.
The initial model developed (on the BCBS plan data) to predict spending, omit ted two groups that received special treat ment at the end of the process-those who would receive the low income subsidy (LIS) and the long-term institutionalized (LTI).
grOUper
The model uses particular demographic characteristics and diagnoses to predict the following years expected costs for an individual. The ICD-9-CM diagnoses are clustered within groups homogeneous both clinically and in costs. Each included characteristic and condition present con tributes to the total prediction for an indi vidual through a formula that sums the incremental contributions. The groupings used to predict drug spending are variants of the groups used to predict Parts A and B spending.
We wanted to create a grouper that was similar to the grouper that was used to pre dict Parts A and B spending while being homogeneous for drug spending rather than non-pharmacy spending. We began by estimating a prospective model regressing spending in the payment year on the base year diagnosis grouping (DXG 2 ) of diag noses that are the basis of the CMS-HCC model. Results of this regression and some specific issues of the evaluation were: (1) whether there were DXGs that did not have implications for drug spending in the next year; (2) whether the grouping of DXGs into condition categories used in the CMS HCC model was appropriate for a drug spending model; (3) whether the DXGs should be combined differently than in the CMS-HCC model; and (4) whether any CCs should not be included in the drug model. We re-estimated the model based on the received recommendations and had them reviewed by an interdisciplinary panel of clinicians. The clinicians reviewed the sta tistical results and assessed the groupings using the same criteria as previously men tioned. We re-estimated the model based on clinical input. Iterating this process with the clinicians ultimately resulted in a grou per that changed few of the narrow DXG building blocks. However, the DXGs are assembled into larger condition disease cat egories that often differ from the CMS-HCC groups. The relationship between diagnosis and costs is not the same for Parts A and B spending as for drug spending.
In development of the model's grouper, drug spending in dollars was the dependent variable of a linear regression that estimated the incremental spending related to each of the explanatory variables in the model. It was easier for clinicians to evaluate a model that predicts the total cost of drugs needed for a condition than plan liability, which is the result of a complex formula. In May 2004, based on these preliminary results, CMS announced the 5,542 ICD-9-CM codes under consideration for inclusion in the drug risk-adjustment model.
The RxHCC diagnostic classification system groups the more than 15,000 ICD 9-CM diagnosis codes into 197 condition categories, or RxCCs. As with the CMS HCC model, all ICD-9-CM codes are clas sified into disease groups despite the limited number in the final model. RxCCs describe major diseases and are broadly organized into body systems. As in the CMS-HCC model some of the disease groups are clustered in hierarchies. Clini cal review found that drug regimens may get more intense, and more drugs may be added when a disease has a higher sever ity. In such a case, when the model has higher and lower severity categories, if the higher cost category of the related dis eases is reported, coding of the lower cost category is ignored. Such is the case with diabetes: diabetes with complications over rides uncomplicated diabetes. If the drugs for diseases differ from one another, even if the diseases are related, the RxHCCs are not placed in the same hierarchy and remain additive. Conditions not in the same hierarchy contribute independently to the total prediction. After the hierarchies are imposed, the RxCCs become RxHCCs. The categories and hierarchies used in the model are presented in Tables 2 and 3 .
pooling BCBS plan and Medicaid Data
While the grouper was formed by esti mating a spending model using only BCBS plan data, the final model was estimated using a pooled plan Medicaid data set. There were a number of problems in inte grating the data sets: (1) the Medicaid group is low income and received drugs at out-of-pocket costs quite different from BCBS plan enrollees; (2) because of price differences, utilization would probably dif fer from that under the BCBS plan benefit, even for the same diseases; and (3) the cost data were from a different year and from many Medicaid Programs. In integrating the two data sets we converted the Medic aid data to spending patterns similar to that which would have occurred, on average, under a BCBS plan benefit.
First, since the data are for different years, inflation factors were applied to eliminate spending differences due to price inflation. The spending in both data sets was multiplied by inflation factors calcu lated using the 2003 national health account prescription drug spending projections by CMS actuaries to project spending levels in 2006. We inflated to 2006 dollars because the cost-sharing ranges are defined in abso lute dollar terms for 2006; thus, spending had to be projected to levels appropriate to 2006. Dollars from the year 2000 were mul tiplied by 2.039, while 2002 dollars were multiplied by 1.554. Second, the model estimated with BCBS plan data for the aged, was applied to the dual eligible aged population to pre dict their spending as it would be under a BCBS plan benefit. This modeling incorpo rated the different demographic and dis ease profiles of the Medicaid population in the predictions. The actual spending in the Medicaid data was then compared to the predicted spending. The ratio of the predicted to the actual spending was used to convert the spending in the Medicaid files to levels compatible with BCBS plan. The conversion factor was analyzed across the age/sex groups appearing in both data sets and, except for the sparse age group 95 or over was quite stable. With the data sets merged it became possible to estimate a full model across all ages and include age-specific add-ons for some diseases. This sample represents beneficiaries all of whom are presumed to have the BCBS plan benefit structure. The data in the two samples were weighted to make the data representative of the Medicare population.
Computing Standard Benefit plan liability
The requirement of the risk-adjustment model was to predict the cost of drugs to the Part D plans, not the total spending that was modeled thus far. The decision to estimate a plan liability model based on the standard benefit was arrived at in consulta tion with industry actuaries after studying the difficulties, both technical and opera tional, in modeling an unknown spectrum of possible benefit variations. Despite the discontinuous pattern of plan liability as spending varies, a linear model based on plan liability produces reasonable results. The plan liability model uses the grouper developed for the total spending model. The coefficients were estimated, however, on data altered to reflect plan liability. Before applying the cost sharing to cre ate plan liability, the spending data went through one additional adjustment. It is generally observed that spending patterns are affected by income and prices. The model described thus far incorporated the cost-sharing patterns of the plan ben efit. The cost sharing in Part D is some what higher than in plan for the non-LIS 3 population. CMS' Office of the Actuary estimated a 19-percent impact on spend ing from imposing the Part D benefit structure on these data. Thus, we reduced spending by 19 percent for non-institu tionalized beneficiaries. Spending by insti tutionalized beneficiaries is assumed to be less discretionary and invariant to the change in benefit structure.
We used the benefit structure rules applied to the adjusted spending to derive plan liability for each beneficiary. Payments were annualized by dividing by the fraction of the payment year each beneficiary was eligible. In the regressions, the observa tions were weighted by the same eligibility fraction. Two models were estimated: (1) an overall spending model and (2) a plan liability model using the non-institutional ized beneficiaries. 3 The low income subsidy reduces premiums, in some cases to $0, and has low copayments.
MODelS rxHCC
The RxHCC models have the specifica tion:
+ e it where Age/Sex denotes 24 mutually exclusive age/sex cells, and OrigDis rep resents originally disabled status: those who are currently age 65 or over, but were first entitled to Medicare before age 65 by disability. RxHCC is a vector of diagnostic categories; and Disabled RxHCC denotes three potential incremental payments for beneficiaries entitled by disability. The model is additive across age/sex status, originally disabled status, and the RxHCC categories. The three disease groups with additional payments for the disabled are schizophrenia, other major psychiatric dis orders, and cystic fibrosis. These amounts are added to the main entry for the diagno sis. In the spending model, Cost denotes total prescription drug expenditures, while in the payment model Cost denotes the plan liability.
risk-adjustment Spending Model
A risk-adjustment model predicting total drug spending at the person level is displayed in Table 2 . The final spending model is comprised of 84 RxHCCs. Simi lar to the development of the CMS-HCC model, the final spending model excludes diagnostic categories when the diagnoses were vague/nonspecific, discretionary in medical treatment or coding, not significant predictors of drug use, or transitory or not admitting of definitive treatment.
Because one cannot predict all of the next year diseases and drug consequences from prior year diagnoses, the demo graphic coefficients are significant in mag nitude. The age/sex coefficients indicate that drug expenditures not directly asso ciated with the diseases in the model rise with age until they reach a peak for the age group 45-54. Older age groups tend to use fewer prescription drugs not accounted for by their known disease profile. The RxHCC coefficients reflect the average drug impli cations of different diseases to individuals. By far, the largest costs are associated with human immunodeficiency virus acquired immunodeficiency syndrome (HIV/AIDS), but other disease groups also have sub stantial drug implications including diabe tes, schizophrenia (especially among the disabled), multiple sclerosis, Parkinson's disease, and cystic fibrosis. Total costs of a disease to the Medicare Program, however, are driven by disease prevalence as well as the coefficient size. Figure 1 illustrates that plan liability has a non-linear relationship to spending. If the coefficients from a spending model were applied to the plan liability amounts, the predictions would likely overestimate plan liability and be invalid. Consequently, we estimated the plan liability model using the adjusted spending data. The plan liability coefficients are smaller than the coefficients for the spending model, and as would be expected, some changed more than others. For example, the HIV/AIDS coefficient fell from $12,314 to $2,028. The plan liability coefficient is substantially smaller than the corresponding spending coefficient when the disease implies drug use reaches the donut hole or above. Plans are not responsible for any of the costs between $2,250 and $5,100 in total and only 15 percent of the cost above $5,100. As such, diseases with high spending coeffi cients have much lower coefficients in the plan liability model. The model is ultimately expressed not in dollars, but as relative factors. The incre mental dollars associated with each vari able in the model are divided by the mean predicted dollars to produce a relative costliness or risk factor. Summing the risk factors for an individual yields a total riskadjustment factor that, when multiplied by a base rate, yields an individualized capitation payment.
risk-adjustment plan liability Model
When the coefficients in the two models are expressed as relative factors, the differ ences are smaller. This is because the con version to relative factors entails dividing each coefficient by the national mean for spending or liability, as appropriate. Divid ing a large spending coefficient by a large spending mean produces results similar to dividing the smaller liability coefficient by the smaller liability mean. The propor tionality is not uniform, however. Diseases characterizing beneficiaries who tend to have a large proportion of spending in the 100 percent cost sharing range, have their factors reduced by a greater proportion than others. Much of drug spending can have a zero impact on plan liability.
Both the spending and the plan liability model have good predictive power. The R 2 (i.e. the proportion of the total variation in the dependent variable that is explained by the model) exceeds 0.20. This is higher than the explanatory power for the models predicting the more variable Parts A and B costs and comparable to other diagnosis based models for drugs in the literature.
new enrollee Model
The new enrollee model is applied to those beneficiaries for whom a year of com plete diagnostic information does not exist. This includes not only those beneficiaries newly entitled to Medicare, it also includes those who were entitled to only Part A during the data collection year or who were in an MA-PD plan during any part of the data collection year.
The sample for the estimation of this model includes both those who are risk adjustable (i.e., those who were included in the prior regression) as well as those who lack full diagnosis data, but have eligible coverage and costs in the payment year. The estimation is based solely on demo graphic characteristics.
The results of the new enrollee regres sion are shown in Table 4 . All cells are mutually exclusive. For example, the predicted drug expenditures for a male, age 65, who is not originally disabled are $748.16, while predicted expenditures are $1,102.01 if he is originally disabled. The coefficients for both sexes indicate that beneficiaries originally entitled to Medicare due to disability have much higher drug utilization than beneficiaries originally enti tled due to age. Coefficients for females are also consistently greater than for males.
valiDatiOn
Analyses have been made of the predic tive ratios (plan predicted liability in the data divided by actual plan liability) for beneficiaries in deciles of predicted liability ( Table 5 ). Predictive ratios above 1.0 indi cate overprediction; ratios lower than 1.0 indicates underprediction. The model per formed well for both the plan and Medic aid samples. The model over-predicts for the bottom and top deciles. Because a sub stantial portion of a person's risk factor is associated with age and sex, even when dis eases are accounted for, the model tends to overpay for beneficiaries who are predicted to be in the lowest deciles of costs some of whom use no drugs. Unlike the case for Parts A and B, the model also overpredicts payment for the beneficiaries in the highest decile of predicted costs. This is because the coefficients cannot fully reflect the flattening of plan liability for high spend ers. In the middle deciles of predicted costs there is a small degree of underprediction. Predictive ratios from an age/sex model are also presented for comparison. The age/sex model underperforms the RxHCC model for most of the deciles. The most notable differences exist in the bot tom and top deciles. The age/sex model overpredicts more in the low deciles and underpredicts rather than overpredicts in the highest decile. Table 5 also reports predictive ratios for individuals who were hospitalized in the base year. The comparison between the age/sex model and risk-adjustment model is particularly striking. The age/sex model overpredicts by 7 percent for individuals without hospitalizations, but underpredicts by 34 percent for individuals with four or more hospitalizations. The risk-adjust ment model predicts very accurately for beneficiaries with fewer than four hospital izations. Unlike the age/sex model, which underpredicts for the costliest enrollees, the risk model overpredicts for individuals with the most hospitalizations. 
SpeCial aDJUStMentS
Medicare's lti Subpopulations
It has been observed that the LTI (defined here as those in a nursing home for more than 90 days) are heavy users of drugs and that, to some extent, the pricing of their drugs is higher than pricing in the community. Many reasons related to pric ing and utilization can be posited for the differences. Analysis of data from IMS, a leading collector of prescription drug sales data, has shown that for the most frequent drugs the mean price difference is about 2 percent. The difference is larger for generic drug than brand name drug, but the brand name drug dominates when the data are expenditure weighted. To mea sure empirically the overall effect of being in an institution rather than in the commu nity, the pooled plan/Medicaid data for the LTI population were analyzed to determine how much capitated payments should be changed from that which is predicted by the model. In developing a model that predicts drug use from knowledge of prior year diagno ses the LTI populations were intentionally omitted because CMS and the Department of Health and Human Services wished to have a clear and separate adjustment for institutionalized status. Other modeling methods could have integrated the institu tionalized into the model or structured a separate model for them. However, the LTI sample size was relatively small. To derive the adjustment, the community model was used to predict spending and plan liabil ity for the institutionalized enrollees. The actual spending and plan liability were then compared to the predicted to derive an adjustment factor. Table 6 shows the predicted and actual means for spending by the LTI. The results indicate that actual spending by LTI ben eficiaries exceeds predicted spending in the aged and disabled groups by 22 and 40 percent respectively. Increments of these amounts would be corrective for spend ing predictions. It is important to note that the mean predicted and actual spending for LTI patients falls into the 100 percent coinsurance range for the aged, and that the mean actual spending for the disabled falls into the catastrophic range. Because the predicted mean for the aged using the community model is one-third of the dis tance through the 100 percent coinsur ance range; increments to spending related to institutionalization will also fall largely within the 100 percent coinsurance range. The disabled model prediction is close to the catastrophic range and incremental spending related to institutionalization will tend to spill into the range for which plans have some liability. Spending changes in the 100 percent coinsurance range result in no change to plan liability.
Analysis of the effect of institution alization on plan liability results in LTI adjustment factors consistent with the previous observations. The factors are smaller because 100 percent coinsurance reduces changes in plan liability. The aged liability increment multiplier is only 7.6 per cent, down from the 22 percent for spend ing. The liability increment multiplier for the disabled is substantial at 21.1 percent, though one-half of that is for spending. If an individual is both a low-income subsidy eli gible beneficiary and is in long-term care, only the long-term care multiplier applies to that beneficiary.
low-income Subsidy
The populations eligible for the LIS subsidies are defined in the MMA. CMS' Office of the Actuary estimated multipliers for two groups spanning the LIS population (Table 7) . They are 1.08 for Group 1 indi viduals and 1.05 for Group 2 individuals. Eligibility is defined on a concurrent basis. For example, if an individual is not defined as low income for January 2006, but is determined to be a Group 1 beneficiary for February 2006, the plan would receive the low income multiplier for February (and beyond), but not for January.
COnClUSiOn
This article has presented the develop ment of the CMS-RxHCC prescription drug risk-adjustment model implemented in 2006. A major challenge to the work was finding and adapting data that would span the Medicare population and be reason ably geographically representative. Future work, using actual program data, is needed to evaluate the performance of the model, to recalibrate on program data, and to develop next generation models that may incorporate prior drug use. One of the issues for any model for drug spending is the change of available products over time. New high-priced drugs are being brought to market as older drugs are becoming cheaper generics. How robust this type of model is in a dynamic market is a topic of great interest. The fact that the model is used for only a portion of the total pay ments to plans makes its absolute accu racy less critical and allows time to develop potential improvements.
